Not-so-superfund: growing needs vs. declining dollars. by Schmidt, Charles W
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emember Love Canal? This 16-acre landfill in Niagara Falls,
New York, was contaminated with more than 21 tons of
industrial pollutants dumped there by the Hooker Chemical
Company, and later surrounded by residential housing and an ele-
mentary school. Love Canal became the poster child for toxic waste
sites in the United States during the late 1970s and a symbolic
launchpad for Superfund, a federal
program initiated in 1980 to ensure
the cleanup of such sites using money
supplied by polluting industries.  
Cut to 2003. Superfund (technical-
ly, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act) has survived scrutiny,
often harsh criticism, and the latest
round of reappropriations. A contro-
versial, battered, and often underfund-
ed program, Superfund has, despite its
myriad problems, achieved a lasting
environmental legacy. But though the
program’s immediate future now seems
secure, the long-term outlook is far
from certain. 
Superfund’s Checkered Past
More than 260 of the nation’s most
toxic sites—many, like Love Canal,
loaded with drums oozing industrial
chemicals—have been cleaned under
the program and removed from the
program’s National Priorities List
(NPL), according to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). An additional 580 sites have
been deemed “construction complete”
by the EPA. This means that no further
on-site cleanup (which often resembles
construction or actually involves construction of containment facili-
ties) is necessary, all immediate threats have been eliminated, and all
long-term threats are under control. A site may reach construction
complete status without all cleanup work being finished, and these
sites remain on the NPL.
But despite these achievements, Superfund has long been an easy
target among stakeholders who bemoan its perceived heavy-handed
bureaucracy. Superfund has been decried as being slowed by its histor-
ical baggage, political divisiveness, mandatory business bashing, and
legalistic maneuverings. 
Underlying most, if not all, of these problems is the cost of cleanups
under the program. In the 2001 report Superfund’s Future: What Will It
Cost?, published at the request of Congress by the Washington, D.C.,
research group Resources for the Future (RFF), cleanups were calculated
to take eight years on average from start to finish for relatively simple
sites and much longer—perhaps decades—for more complex ones. Site
cleanups can range in cost from hundreds of thousands to hundreds
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The Shrinking Trust Fund
Since 1996, the government’s
reserve for cleaning up Superfund
sites has been steadily depleted.
The circles at left are proportional
to the unappropriated balance of
the trust fund at the end of each
fiscal year indicated below.
$3,789 million 1996
$2,636 million 1997
$2,115 million 1998
$1,504 million 1999
$1,262 million 2000
$860 million 2001
$564 million 2002
$159 million
(estimated) 2003
Source: U.S. EPA.of millions of dollars. Additional costs
include legal fees, negotiations, and adminis-
trative costs incurred in forcing responsible
parties to pay. 
Shortfalls in Budgets and in Cleanups
Superfund is now facing an especially diffi-
cult challenge: tackling its ongoing workload
in the face of a growing gap between the
funding Congress provides and that which is
needed to tackle its residual workload.
According to the Congressional Research
Service at the Library of Congress, the Bush
administration’s fiscal year 2003 Superfund
appropriation request of $1.27 billion is
roughly $355 million less than the projected
need for the year, as calculated in Superfund’s
Future. “The program is clearly at a juncture
where they have more work than they can
do,” says Katherine Probst, a senior fellow at
RFF and coauthor of the report. 
Some experts say the shortfall is affecting
Superfund’s twofold mandate: to identify par-
ties responsible for contamination at specific
sites and hold them liable for cleanup, and to
address “orphaned” sites, where the responsi-
ble polluter can’t be located or doesn’t have
the resources to clean up the site. Meanwhile,
more than 1,200 sites remain on the NPL,
according to Mike Cook, director of the
EPA’s Office of Emergency and Remedial
Response. Many of these are enormous “meg-
asites” for which actual or estimated cleanup
costs start at $50 million; the average cost for
such megasites is $140 million. 
Paralleling the funding gap is a precipi-
tous decline in the number of sites addressed
annually under Superfund. The program des-
ignated a peak average of 85 sites per year as
construction complete from 1997 to 2000.
But in 2002, this number fell to just 42,
unleashing a wave of criticism toward the
EPA and the Bush administration from envi-
ronmentalists and some members of
Congress. Whether the slowdown is linked
directly to the funding shortfall is a matter of
debate. 
EPA officials are reluctant to suggest the
two are linked. For instance, Marianne
Horinko, assistant administrator in the EPA’s
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response, says the slowdown has occurred
mainly because so many sites remaining on
the NPL are large and complex. “The easier
sites got cleaned up first,” she says. “The ones
that remain—for instance, mining and sedi-
ment sites—are much more challenging and
expensive to clean.” 
Probst acknowledges that the “low-hang-
ing fruit” in terms of site cleanups on the
Superfund NPL has probably already been
picked. “Many of the early sites had just one
cleanup,” she explains. “Sites today tend to
have multiple cleanups in different areas
going on at once.” But it is precisely because
many remaining sites are so large and com-
plicated that Superfund needs the additional
money to carry out its mandate, she adds.
According to RFF estimates, annual funding
for the Superfund program should be
increased to $1.6 billion (adjusted for infla-
tion) every year through 2007.
According to Probst, budget shortages
are producing a “crisis of confidence” within
the program. “One senses the emergence of a
triage mentality,” she says. “Existing
cleanups seem to be getting funded while
new ones are put on hold. Program man-
agers are having to make difficult choices.
People are getting nervous.” 
Other stakeholders blame the budget
shortfall for the drop in cleanup comple-
tions. This view was recently backed up by
an investigation performed by the EPA
Office of the Inspector General, released on
25 October 2002, that provides documenta-
tion that funding shortages are impacting
EPA-led cleanups in a number of areas. The
report found a $97 million gap between
what was requested and what was actually
provided for fiscal year 2002. Moreover, the
report cites local EPA officials in suggesting
that contamination on at least three of these
sites poses ongoing risks to human health
and the environment. The report was
addressed to James Jeffords (I–Vermont),
then chairman of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works. 
Unmitigated environmental risks may
not be the only problem associated with the
declining budget, adds Grant Cope, an envi-
ronmental attorney and Superfund expert
formerly with the U.S. Public Interest
Research Group and now based in Seattle,
Washington. The EPA needs sufficient
resources to negotiate with polluting indus-
tries, he explains. The Superfund law requires
that the EPA allow cleanups to be managed
and paid for by those deemed responsible for
contamination at specific sites. These entities
are typically, but not always, private compa-
nies; in the Superfund lexicon they are called
“potentially responsible parties” (PRPs).
They can be held liable for three times the
cost of cleanup if they resist this obligation,
forcing the EPA itself to foot the bill,
although Probst says this provision has been
little used. 
Where the EPA does step in to pay for
cleanups, the agency can recover its costs
from PRPs after the fact. In recent years,
more than 70% of new long-term cleanups at
nonfederal sites—costing more than $20 bil-
lion—were initiated by private parties. “The
reaction of PRPs makes perfect sense, given
Superfund’s settlement process or any poten-
tially costly negotiation process,” says Cope.
“If polluters know that EPA doesn’t have suf-
ficient resources to pay for needed cleanups,
they will drag their feet to get a better deal.”
Revisiting Polluter-Pays Taxes
With a growing perception that Superfund is
in a budget crisis, some stakeholders are
insisting on a reinstatement of the industry
taxes that sustained the program for much of
its history. These taxes were abolished when
the law that authorized them expired at the
end of 1995. The taxes in question are root-
ed in Superfund’s inception. When the pro-
gram went into effect on 1 January 1981, the
primary funding mechanism was a trust fund
fed by a tax on chemical feedstocks. When
Superfund was reauthorized in 1986,
Congress continued that tax and added two
new ones, a petroleum tax and a corporate
environmental tax. Industrial fines and
penalties, various cost recoveries from pol-
luters, and interest on the balance, in addi-
tion to money from the general U.S.
Treasury, also contributed to the fund.
These taxes represented a fundamental com-
ponent of the “polluter pays” principle upon
which Superfund was founded. However,
they were eliminated in 1995 when Congress
failed to reach agreement on reinstating
them as part of a comprehensive Superfund
reauthorization.
Every effort to reauthorize the taxes since
1995 has failed. The Clinton administration
routinely requested reinstatement of the taxes
in its budget proposals, but its efforts were
lukewarm and insufficient to defeat the activ-
ities of those who fought against them.
Consistent with its disdain for taxes in gener-
al, the Bush administration dropped the
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General Electric facility, Hudson River, New York.reauthorization request from its proposed
budget altogether. 
Meanwhile, the trust fund has steadily
dwindled. By the end of fiscal year 2003, the
balance will be an estimated $159 million,
according to EPA spokesman David Ryan.
This includes the $36 million balance in the
fund from when the taxes were discontinued
as well as revenues from sources such as inter-
est on this balance and cost recoveries from
PRPs. This is down from a high of $3.8 bil-
lion in 1996. Therefore, Congress must
increasingly draw off general tax revenues to
finance the annual Superfund appropriation.
General revenues make up 50% of current
funding and may increase to as much as 80%
for fiscal year 2004, according to the
Congressional Research Service. Eventually,
experts say, the fund reserves will hit zero.
And when they do, general appropriations
will fund Superfund in its entirety. 
Cope argues that reinstatement of the
Superfund taxes represents the best way to
raise the Superfund appropriation to RFF’s
annual target of $1.6 billion. “If the federal
government would make polluters pay their
taxes, this would increase available funding
for cleanups and free up taxpayer funds to
pay for other much-needed programs,” he
says. Apparently, some members of Congress
agree: Both Barbara Boxer (D–California)
and Frank Pallone (D–New Jersey) have
introduced bills calling for reinstatement of
the taxes this year. 
The bottom line, says Probst, is that
Superfund appropriations were larger (for
instance, the $1.6 billion appropriation in
1991) when the trust fund was full. Her con-
cern is that as the fund dwindles, Superfund
appropriations may decline rather than
increase in years to come. 
Even so, Probst is somewhat reluctant to
call for resumption of the Superfund taxes in
order to raise additional funds. “I don’t know
that it makes sense to impose more taxes just
to raise three to four hundred million dol-
lars,” she says. “I’m not willing to say we
shouldn’t. But really, that’s peanuts in the
context of the federal budget. Congress could
easily get more than that from general tax
revenues.” 
The Problem of Megasites
The wild cards in the Superfund game are
the megasites that increasingly dominate the
program’s agenda. Most of these sites repre-
sent a range of industrial facilities similar to
those at lower-cost Superfund sites. Some
include sediment-contaminated estuaries and
rivers and abandoned mines that can absorb
hundreds of millions of dollars in studies and
remediation costs. 
Interestingly, these sites were hardly
considered when Superfund was first autho-
rized more than 20 years ago, says Kerry
Kelly, the waste team leader at the American
Chemistry Council, an industry trade group
based in Arlington, Virginia. In Superfund’s
early days, she says, the task was fairly
straightforward: to address more traditional
industrial and municipal landfill sites with
abandoned drums and contaminated soils,
and to have the remediation paid for by
more easily identifiable PRPs. 
Today’s megasites are vastly different.
Sediment sites may
require difficult and
expensive remediations
with highly uncertain
outcomes. For example,
the EPA is undertaking
the largest sediment
dredging cleanup in his-
tory in the Hudson
River. The effort is antic-
ipated to cost nearly half
a billion dollars (and is
being funded by General
Electric, the PRP). However, as sediment
dredging is an inexact science, experts do
not know if it will achieve the targeted
objective of reducing tissue concentrations
of polychlorinated biphenyls in fish, the
main source of exposure for residential pop-
ulations [see “The Hudson: A River Runs
through an Environmental Controversy,”
EHP 110:A184–A187 (2002)]. 
Then, too, these sites are often contami-
nated with “historical” pollution—for exam-
ple, polychlorinated biphenyls, DDT, and
other pollutants discharged by numerous
entities including cities, ports, industry, and
agriculture over many decades. Identifying
PRPs is highly challenging because the con-
tamination has often been contributed by
multiple sources over periods of many
decades. And, says Cope, “getting them to
pay for cleanup without a protracted legal
case is very difficult.”
Meanwhile, the EPA estimates that up to
10% of all sediments underlying U.S. waters
are contaminated with pollutants at concen-
trations that may have a direct impact on
human and ecological health. Mining sites
pose some similar problems [see “The Earth’s
Open Wounds: Abandoned and Orphaned
Mines,” p. A154 this issue]. Contamination
is often extensive, PRPs are absent, and
cleanup costs are exorbitant. To provide one
example, the EPA has already spent over
$250 million on “various cleanup and sup-
port activities” at the Bunker Hill Mining
and Metallurgic site in Idaho.
Megasites currently make up about 8%
of the sites on the NPL; estimating the num-
ber of future megasites expected to come
under Superfund is difficult to do. State offi-
cials have stated that, from their perspective,
some of these sites seem to come out of
nowhere. The Federal Creosote site in New
Jersey, for example, was added to the NPL in
1999, more than 30 years after pollutant
releases occurred and 3 years after the pollu-
tants—buried in underlying soils—were first
noticed. The expected costs to the EPA at
this site, which are external to the costs levied
on the PRPs, range from $50 million to
$100 million. 
Not surprisingly, some stakeholders are
now suggesting that Superfund—especially
in light of its current budget problems—
doesn’t have the resources to deal effectively
with megasites and may not even be the
appropriate vehicle for attempting to do so.
“Just a few of these sites could break the
bank,” Probst says. 
Cook, who was a key architect of the
original Superfund legislation, says the agency
is now grappling with the best way to set pri-
orities for megasites according to the risks
they pose to public health. The EPA is also
attempting to develop a method for isolating
smaller site components under Superfund
when the contamination is spread over a large
area. These alternatives are currently being
explored by a Superfund subcommittee estab-
lished under the National Advisory Council
for Environmental Policy and Technology,
which is a multistakeholder advisory commit-
tee to the EPA. According to Cook, the sub-
committee’s recommendations are expected
in the next 12–18 months. 
Although it’s too soon to say, the sub-
committtee’s conclusions will likely reflect
the need for substantial changes in the pro-
gram. Superfund has been instrumental in
cleaning up the environment and protecting
public health, but it has done so at tremen-
dous financial cost. Some experts predict
that within 10 years Superfund will evolve
into a “caretaker program” that limits its
activities to a few dozen complex, long-term
cleanup projects and that the bulk of the
nation’s cleanup will be conducted outside
Superfund in more community-centered
and economics-driven programs such as
brownfields programs, voluntary cleanups,
and state programs.
Charles W. Schmidt
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By some estimates,
Superfund should be funded at
$1.6 billion per yearx
through 2007. .....
By the end of fiscal year 2003,
the fund will contain about
$159 million.